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12.1 Introduction
Literature on emerging capital markets is growing rapidly. While the lit-
erature covers diverse topics (see Bekaert and Harvey 2002 for a recent re-
view), one of the key issues that constantly draws researchers’ attention is
eﬀect of stock market openings on the cost of capital. The prediction of
theories is well known. In a standard international asset pricing model, a
stock market opening reduces the opening economy’s cost of capital by
allowing risk sharing between domestic and foreign agents (Bekaert and
Harvey 1995; Eun and Janakiramanan 1986; Errunza and Losq 1989;
Errunza, Senbet, and Hogan 1998). Several studies have tested the theo-
retical prediction using cross-country data from emerging markets, and re-
port the cross-country data indeed confirms the prediction (Bekaert and
Harvey 2000; Henry 2000; Kim and Singal 2000). It is important to note
that empirical studies find desirable eﬀects of market openings on the cost
of capital, while empirical evidence for impacts on market volatility of
opening produces ambiguous results (Bekaert and Harvey 2000; Aggar-
wal, Inclan, and Leal 1999).
In this chapter, we follow previous research and study changes in the cost
of capital after a stock market opening. The diﬀerence between this chap-
ter and existing works is that we focus on the Korean experience. By re-
stricting the scope of research to a single country, this chapter takes the risk
of lower empirical power than previous works, which utilize cross-country
data sets. Despite the potential caveat, we seek to complement existing
studies in the following manner. First, we take a longer-term perspective in
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examining eﬀects of Korean stock market opening on the cost of capital.
A stock market opening is a gradual process. When we measure the pro-
gress of openings by regulatory liberalization, emerging economies’ expe-
riences show liberalization processes usually take several years to be com-
pleted. In Korea, for example, the first deregulation that allowed foreign
investment in the Korean stock market occurred in 1992. But, final elimi-
nation of regulatory restrictions on foreign investment did not take place
until 1998. Partly because completion of market opening is a relatively re-
cent event in most emerging economies, existing studies focus on initial
opening dates when examining the eﬀect of market openings on the cost of
capital. Also their windows of examination are limited to two or three
years around initial opening dates. As for Korea, Henry’s (2000) sample
covers only up to the end of 1994, and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) stop at
the end of 1995. As a result, existing works are vulnerable to the hot money
problem. They may find a decrease in the cost of capital not because the
stock market is opened to foreign investors, but because horizons of their
analysis are confined to when markets are doing well. In this chapter, we
examine changes in the cost of capital of the Korea stock market for the
past thirteen years, from 1992 to 2004. We compare the cost of capital dur-
ing the liberalization era with the post-liberalization era, with each era in-
cluding about six years. Following Bekaert and Harvey’s (2000) argument,
we employ the dividend yield as a measure of the cost of capital. We find
that the dividend yield is larger in the post-liberalization era when the Ko-
rean stock market is fully opened. In fact, the dividend yield appears to
have decreased only around 1992, the initial opening year, and then con-
tinued to rise as liberalization of the Korean stock market advanced.
Using firm level panel data we analyze, in detail, what eﬀects greater for-
eign presence in the Korean stock market has brought on the dividend
yield. We examine what trends emerge when controlling other factors and
regressing the dividend yield on degrees of foreign ownership. We obtain
an interesting result. The higher the degree of foreign ownership in a firm,
the lower the dividend yield is. Notably, the negative relationship between
foreign ownership and the dividend yield is only significant during recent
years when the Korea stock market has been fully opened.
The results of this chapter are in contrast to the existing studies based on
cross-country data sets that find most of the eﬀects of market opening on
the cost of capital tend to appear around the initial liberalization dates
(Bekaert and Harvey 2000; Henry 2000; Kim and Singal 2000). According
to the existing studies, the cost of capital goes down, responding to the ini-
tial market opening as further risk sharing becomes feasible. If this risk
sharing story is correct, revaluation of stocks triggered by the market
opening is likely to be concentrated in those stocks that attract foreign in-
vestment. This likely because foreign ownership of a stock indicates the
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stock now belongs to the global portfolio.1 The conclusion of this chap-
ter—that higher foreign ownership produces lower dividend yield—is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that market opening decreases the cost of capi-
tal. However, our finding that the negative relationship between foreign
ownership and dividend yield is only visible after the liberalization process
is completed suggests that the mere beginning of a liberalization process
may not be enough to produce the negative eﬀect of market opening on the
cost of capital.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 12.2, we briefly
describe the stock market opening process in Korea and examine the trend
in the cost of capital. In section 12.3, we present the analysis based on the
panel data set. Section 12.4 contains concluding remarks.
12.2 Descriptive Findings
12.2.1 Regulatory Changes
Foreign investor’s direct access to the Korean stock market2 was prohib-
ited until January 1992. At that time, the Korean government began al-
lowing foreign participation in the Korean stock market, but with ceiling
regulations. Foreign ownership was limited to 10 percent in, so-called, or-
dinary companies and 8 percent in public interest companies that were
deemed of national interest, such as defense and communications. The 10
percent ceiling was subsequently raised to 12 percent in December 1994
and to 15 percent in July 1995 (see table 12.1). The pace of deregulation was
accelerated during 1996 and 1997 when the Korean economy was under
foreign liquidity problems. The foreign investment restriction was relaxed
six times over the two years, raising the ceiling to 55 percent for ordinary
companies. Toward the end of 1997 the Korean economy fell victim to a
currency crisis. To deal with the currency crisis, the ceiling regulation for
ordinary companies finally was eliminated in May 1998.
Another notable deregulation measure taken during the currency crisis
period was the relaxation of the limit on foreign individual ownership. Ini-
tially the individual ownership ceiling was set at 3 percent in 1992. Al-
though there were subsequent moderations, it still stood at 7 percent as of
November 1997, rendering foreign controlling ownership in Korean com-
panies impossible. In December 1997 when the Korean currency crisis
erupted, the individual ceiling was raised to 50 percent. The individual ceil-
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1. For a detailed explanation on stock revaluation due to risk sharing, see Chari and Henry
(2005).
2. There are two stock exchanges in Korea: the Korea Stock Exchange and the Kosdaq
Market. The former is a main board and traditional market, while the latter is a Korean ver-
sion of the Nasdaq. In the paper, we focus on the Korea Stock Exchange.
ing regulation was finally abolished in May 1998, together with the com-
pany level ceiling regulation.
Though the ceiling regulation for public interest companies still remains,
the Korean stock market has been practically fully opened since May 1998.
The ceiling on public interest companies was raised to 30 percent in May
1998 and to 40 percent in November 2000. As of 2005, the ratio of nonin-
vestible stocks for foreigners is 5.3 percent (see table 12.2).
Foreign Investment Flows into the Korean Stock Market
Since the implementation of the initial opening measure in January
1992, there has been a steady flow of foreign capital into the Korean stock
market (see figures 12.1, 12.2). When the market was fully opened in May
1998, the pace of capital inflow accelerated significantly. As a result, the
foreign participation ratio has continued to be on an upward trend since
1992. The pace of the trend stayed mild until 1997, as the ratio rose to 12.9
percent over the six years from 1992 to 1997 (see figure 12.3). After the full
opening in 1998, the slope of the upward trend became steep. The foreign
participation rate jumped to 21.9 percent in 1999, and then continued to
increase, reaching 30 percent in 2000. The rate remained on an upward
trend, except for a slight setback in 2002. At the end of 2005 foreign in-
vestors claim around 40 percent of the Korean stock market capitalization.
12.2.2 Change in the Dividend Yield
Bekaert and Harvey (2000) argue that the dividend yield is a better mea-
sure of the capital of cost than expected returns. Following their argument,
we examine the trend in the dividend yield during the stock market open-
ing and the post-opening years in Korea.
Figure 12.4 shows the trend in the dividend yield of listed companies in
the Korean stock market for the past sixteen years starting from 1990.
Each year’s dividend yield is computed as a ratio of the total value of divi-
dends paid by listed companies during the year to the market capitalization
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Table 12.1 Stock market opening in Korea: Changes in foreign investment ceilings
1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000
1 12 7 4 10 5 11 12.11 12.30 5 11
Company-level ceiling
Ordinary companies 10 12 15 18 20 23 26 50 55 — —
Public interest companies 8 8 10 12 15 18 21 25 25 30 40
Individual-level ceiling
Ordinary companies 3 3 3 4 5 6 7 50 50 — —
Public interest companies 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3
Source: Financial Supervisory Service.
Table 12.2 Stock market opening in Korea: Trend in share of noninvestible stocks 
by foreigners
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of companies under 
restriction 10 8 7 7 8 8
Value of stocks under restrictiona 23.5 12.6 10.5 7.2 7.4 5.3
aRatio to Market Capitalization.
Fig. 12.1 Trend in foreign investors’ trading in the Korea stock exchange: Ratio to
the total
Fig. 12.2 Trend in net-buy by foreign investors in the Korea stock exchange: Trend
measured at the end of the year. The presented figure illustrates that the
dividend yield was on a downward trend before the initial market opening
in 1992. After the implementation of the partial opening measure in 1992,
the decreasing trend lasted one more year, but was overturned in 1994. For
the following years until the eruption of the currency crisis of 1997, it ap-
pears that the dividend yield remained on an upward trend.
Descriptive statistics of the dividend yield are reported in table 12.3. Di-
viding the sixteen years into the precrisis and the postcrisis period, means
and standard deviations of the dividend yield for each period are com-
puted. A simple test comparing mean-diﬀerences between the precrisis
and postcrisis period is conducted. The result shows that the mean of the
dividend yield for the postcrisis period is significantly larger.
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Fig. 12.3 Trend in foreign investors’ participation rate in the Korea stock exchange
Fig. 12.4 Trend in the cost of capital: Dividend yield (1990–2005)
12.3 Regression Strategy and Data
12.3.1 Question and Potential Explanations
The inspection of the trend in the dividend yield gives rise to a natural
question: why have dividend yields increased after the economic crisis of
1997 when the Korean stock market is fully opened and foreign investor
participation in the market is rising?
In measuring the eﬀect of market opening on the cost of capital through
the dividend yield, some factors may blur the relationships between the two
need to be considered. The dividend yield is a function of not only the cost
of capital but also future dividend flows. Hence, negative relationship of
the market opening on the dividend yield holds when the future dividend
flows remain constant. Any factor that changes future dividend flows may
hinder one from observing the negative eﬀect of the market opening on the
dividend yield. Indeed, Henry (2000) reports that macroeconomic reform
measures, other than capital market openings, also make significant im-
pacts on the cost of capital in emerging economies, presumably by chang-
ing their growth prospects.
Even if one can hold future dividend flows constant, it still may not be
easy to identify the impact of market opening on the dividend yield pro-
cess. A standard theory predicts the eﬀect of market opening on the cost of
capital and the dividend yield to be negative because market opening
changes marginal investor groups from domestic investors to foreign. But,
it is not clear at which level of foreign ownership the change in the marginal
investor group occurs.
Taking these factors into account, four possible explanations arise re-
garding the eﬀect of the market opening and interpretation of the observed
trend in the dividend yield of the Korean stock market. Based on his cross-
country examination, Henry (2000) argues that the impact of market open-
ing on the cost of capital is visible only around the first opening years.
Though the market opening-process is always gradual in emerging econ-
omies, later opening measures in economies of his sample do not produce
statistically significant eﬀects on the cost of capital. The Korean experi-
ence may be interpreted along this line. One may argue the decreasing
eﬀect of the market opening on the cost of capital and the dividend yield
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Table 12.3 Difference in the dividend yield: During and after the market opening
1992–1998(A) 1999–2005(B) B – A
Mean 1.29 1.82 0.48
Standard deviation 0.22 0.52 (4.07)
Note: ( ) is a t-statistic for the hypothesis ‘B – A = 0.’
had already been realized around 1992, namely the initial period of the
market opening. One can then claim the movement of the dividend yield
during the postcrisis period should not be connected to the market open-
ing. Instead, the increase in the dividend yield may be attributed to other
changes, such as the lowered growth prospect of the Korean economy af-
ter the economic crisis of 1997.
A second and opposing explanation would be that the decreasing eﬀect
of the market opening has actually been materializing during the postcri-
sis years, but disguised by other developments; the decrease in the dividend
yield during the precrisis period is then an eﬀect of other factors instead of
the initial market opening measures. This hypothesis may be justified on
the ground that foreign participation in the Korean stock market had not
reached a critical level before the crisis, which would have been necessary
for the change in the marginal investor group. Only after the crisis, when
foreign ownership in Korean companies rose further, did foreign investors
replace domestic investors as the marginal investor group and begin aﬀect-
ing the cost of capital.
The third hypothesis is that the cost of capital has been declining all
along the liberalization process since the first opening in 1992. The reason
why its eﬀect on the cost of capital is not shown clearly in the movement of
the dividend yield in recent years can be attributed to other factors that
aﬀect dividend flows.
The final possibility is an outright rejection of the prediction that mar-
ket opening should lower the cost of capital. For example, in contrast to
what the theory predicts, foreign investors may be myopic, so that they seek
to maximize short-term returns from their investment in Korean compa-
nies. If foreign investors’ myopic behavior leads them to demand exploit-
ing dividends from Korean companies that cannot be sustained, one may
observe a temporary increase in the dividend yield, as occurred during the
post-crisis period.
12.3.2 Regression Strategy
Strategy
To identify the impact of market opening on the cost of capital, existing
studies such as Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) employ cross-
country regressions. Their strategy is to control the eﬀects of other factors 
on the cost of capital by considering diﬀerences among emerging economies.
As long as macroeconomic profiles and histories of economic reforms are
diﬀerent among emerging economies, it may be argued that cross-country
regressions will correctly identify impacts of stock market openings.3
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3. Henry (2000) includes some dummy variables for macroeconomic reforms in his regres-
sion as an additional attempt to control their eﬀects on measures of the cost of capital. But,
Our approach is diﬀerent. We employ a one-country, firm level panel re-
gression approach instead of a cross-country panel regression. While the
dependent variable in the existing studies is dividend yields of emerging
economies, the dependent variable in our regression is firm level dividend
yields of the Korean stock market. In our regression, macroeconomic
events, including economic reforms that may aﬀect the dividend yield, will
be controlled by time eﬀects. We seek to identify the eﬀect of market open-
ing on the cost of capital and the dividend yield through foreign participa-
tion rates in each company. Our identifying assumption is that if market
opening decreases the cost of capital as foreign investors become marginal
investors, the impact of market opening will be more visible in firms with
higher foreign participation rates. The following is the basic form of the re-
gression equation we run:
(1) DYit  α  βXit  FSit1  Tt  i  εit
In the equation, Xit stands for firm level characteristics that may aﬀect
each firm’s dividend yield. Changes in economic environment such as re-
forms and global market conditions will be controlled by a time-dummy
variable Tt. The variable i is to allow individual fixed eﬀect. The param-
eter of key interest is  that is the coeﬃcient to the foreign participation rate
denoted by FSit.
Control Variables
It has been suggested by many studies in the field of corporate finance
that irrelevance of dividend policy à la Modigliani-Miller does not hold,
and so a firm’s dividend policy is influenced by a variety of variables. Fol-
lowing the literature, we include five variables to control possible variation
in dividend yields due to corporate financial policy: change in investment,
return on asset, change in fixed debt, cash flow, and size of the firm.4
Change in investment (Investment) is defined as the ratio of the change
in investment in fixed assets to the total asset. Inclusion of the variable as
an explanatory variable is primarily based on the theory that regards divi-
dends as a signaling device for a firm’s future profitability. One may pre-
sume that if the prospect of future profitability improves, managers would
increase investment and concurrently increase dividend payout as an at-
tempt to signal their private information to the outside investors.
On the contrary, one can deduce the opposite implication from the sig-
naling motivation on the relationship between investment activities and
dividend policy. Since it is possible for investors to observe the investment
activities of a firm, increase in investment itself may contain rich enough
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identifying economic reforms that may have taken eﬀects on measures of the cost of capital is
hard. It seems that his main strategy to control other variables’ eﬀects on measures of the cost
of capital may exploit cross-country diﬀerences.
4. For a standard reference, see Frankfurter, Wood, and Wansley (2003).
information on a firm’s future growth prospect for the outside investors. In
that case, it is unnecessary for managers to employ dividend policy as an
additional signaling device. This is so because dividends are a relatively
costly signal device due to tax treatment on dividend income. Hence, any
sign of the coeﬃcient to the change in investment would be consistent with
the signaling theory of dividends.
Return on asset (ROA) is the ratio of earnings net of dividend distribu-
tion to preferred stocks to total asset. Earning is the most frequently used
variable in empirical study to explain dividend decisions ever since Lint-
ner’s seminal work (1956). Earnings net of dividend distributed to pre-
ferred stocks constitute the source of funds for either retained earnings or
dividends to common stocks. Therefore, the presumption is that better
earning performance in general leads to higher dividends if liquidity con-
straint is present for some reason.
Both change in fixed debt (Fixed debt) and “cash flow” are variables in-
cluded to take into account cash flow hypothesis (Eckbo and Verma 1994).
Change in fixed debt is normalized by total assets to neutralize scale eﬀect,
and cash flow is defined as operating profit less corporate income tax and
total dividends, which are also normalized by total assets. Cash flow hy-
pothesis argues that investors use dividends as a discipline device for man-
agers by minimizing free cash flow that can be arbitrarily disposed of by
managers. Less dependence on internal sources of funding, in general,
bring in lower monitoring cost through wider exposure to capital markets.
Finally, “size” is measured as the log of real assets and is included to cap-
ture the empirical regularity that larger firms tend to pay out more divi-
dends. It is also possible to justify the inclusion of size variables in terms of
the agency cost argument. Larger firms are more likely to be subject to neg-
ative eﬀects of asymmetric information and have stronger incentive to use
dividends as a signaling device for future profitability.
12.3.3 Data
Sample Selection
In principle, we want to construct a sample consisting of all nonfinancial
firms that have been continuously listed at the Korea Stock Market during
the period 1992–2004. One potential problem with this sampling approach
is survival bias. The dividend yield process of the sample of surviving firms
may be diﬀerent from the total sample. To see whether there are any tangi-
ble diﬀerences in the dividend yield, we present two dividend yield pro-
cesses in figure 12.5. As shown, the two processes have moved closely to-
gether since 1994. But, there appears a visible gap between the two in 1992
and 1993. We take two remedies. First, we restrict our sample period to
1994–2004 when the sample of surviving firms closely represent the total
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sample, as far as movement in the dividend yield is concerned. Second, we
repeat the same regression analysis with the total sample, which includes
delisted firms.
We exclude those firms for which crucial information such as foreign
participation rate or dividends is unavailable. By excluding those firms, we
end up with 411 nonfinancial firms in the surviving firm sample. Table 12.4
describes the basic features of the panel sample.
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Fig. 12.5 Trends in the dividend yield
Table 12.4 Industry composition and relative size of the panel sample to the market
Machinery & Steel & 
chemistry Services Electronics metal Others Total
Sample 140 62 49 29 131 411
1996 204 76 85 43 241 649(760)
1997 213 79 90 43 238 663(776)
1998 211 74 91 43 230 649(748)
1999 211 73 89 43 213 629(725)
2000 209 74 88 42 207 620(704)
2001 208 76 88 41 201 614(689)
2002 212 76 81 39 197 605(683)
2003 212 76 79 41 190 598(684)
2004 214 84 73 40 175 586(683)
Note: ( ) denotes the number of all listed companies including finance industry each year.
Data Source
Stock prices and the share of foreign investors for each listed firm are ex-
tracted from a database maintained by the Korea Security Computing
Corporation (Koscom). Information on all other variables are obtained
from financial statements for listed firms provided by the Korea Informa-
tion Service (KIS).
12.4 Result
12.4.1 Basic Model
Main results of the regression analysis are contained in table 12.5 and
12.6. For simplicity, we do not report the coeﬃcients of individual fixed
eﬀects and time eﬀects. Table 12.5 reports the result when the dividend
yield is regressed on foreign participation rates or the share of foreign in-
vestors’ holding in a firm. The regression is implemented three times for
the changing sample periods: first for the whole sample period, second for
the precrisis sample period, and finally for the postcrisis period. This is to
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Table 12.5 Dividend yields and shares of foreign investors: Regression (1)
Basic Model
Variable 1994–2004 1994–1998 1999–2004
FS(t - 1) –0.0114** 0.0020 –0.0187**
(0.0052) (0.0086) (0.0082)
Investment 0.0030 0.0023 0.0040
(0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0073)
ROA 0.0027** 0.0087*** 0.0022
(0.0013) (0.0034) (0.0015)
Fixed debt 0.0028** –0.0043 0.0024
(0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0016)
Cash flow 0.0008 –0.0025 –0.0044
(0.0045) (0.0098) (0.0056)
Size 0.5533*** 0.1387 0.4911**
(0.0956) (0.1795) (0.1943)
Number of observations 4,521 2,055 2,466
R2 0.0437 0.0505 0.0274
Wald test 352.48***(16) 111.4***(10) 69.63***(11)
Notes: Dependent variable = dividend yield. Standard errors are in parentheses. Wald is the
test statistic for the null hypothesis that all coefficients except for constant term are jointly
zero and degrees of freedom are in the parentheses.
**Statistically significant at 5%
***Statistically significant at 1%
see if the trend in the dividend yield observed in figure 12.4 can be con-
firmed by the regression analysis.
For the whole sample period of 1994–2004, the estimate of the coeﬃ-
cient to the foreign participation rate is negative and significant, which is
encouraging since it implies that the stock market opening and the increase
in foreign participation in the domestic stock market indeed reduces the
cost of capital.
When the whole sample is divided into the two subperiods, an interest-
ing finding emerges. The estimate of the coeﬃcient to the foreign partici-
pation rate remains negative and significant for the postcrisis sample.
However, for the precrisis sample it is estimated positive and insignificant.
The result is a contrast to Henry (2000) and Bekaert and Harvey (2000), as
they report the decreasing eﬀect of market opening on the cost of capital
appears in the early stages of market opening.
12.4.2 Alternative Model
We repeat the regression analysis now allowing for serial correlation in
the dividend yield. Studies exist on dividend policy that emphasize the
presence of inertia in the dividend process (Lintner 1956; Waud 1966).
These studies suggest various empirical specifications based on partial ad-
justment model for dividend change. Allowing for the possibility of inertia
in dividend adjustment, we estimate the following dynamic panel model:
(2) DYit  α  βxit  FSit1  DYit1  i  εit
It is well-known that a typical estimation strategy for a static panel like
equation (1) leads to an inconsistent estimator. Therefore, we resort to an
Arellano and Bond (1988) style GMM estimation procedure in estimating
the dynamic panel model.
The result is presented in table 12.6. The coeﬃcient to the lagged dividend
yield is estimated to be positive and significant, indicating the existence of
persistence in the each year process. But, focusing on the coeﬃcient to the
foreign participation rate, we report that the result is qualitatively un-
changed from the basic regression model. Before ending this section, we
redo the regression analyses with the unbalanced panel including delisted
companies sometime during the sample period. Results are contained in
table 12.7 and 12.8. Significance of the coeﬃcient to the foreign participa-
tion rate becomes marginal in the basic model regression. The result for the
dynamic model remains qualitatively same.
12.4.3 Causality Check
In this section, we conduct a supplementary analysis on the eﬀect of for-
eign investors on dividend yield. We test the existence of a causal relation-
ship in the Granger sense between share of foreign investors and dividend
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yield by taking advantage of the panel vector autoregression (VAR) tech-
nique suggested by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), which has been
recently developed and applied by Grinstein and Michaely (2005) for in-
vestigating firms’ payout policy.
Suppose the following bivariate panel VAR, allowing for time varying
coeﬃcients and individual fixed eﬀect, such that:
(3) DYit  α0t  ∑
m
l1
αltDYitl  ∑
m
l1
βltFSitl  ϕtfi  εit
FSit  0t  ∑
m
l1
ltDYitl  ∑
m
l1
ltFSitl  	tgi  
it,
where i  1, 2, . . . , N is the number of firms and t  1, 2, . . . , and T is the
number of years in the sample. The variable l is the number of time lags in-
cluded for estimation and fi and gi are individual fixed eﬀects allowed for
dividend yield and share of foreign investors, respectively. The variables (α,
β, ϕ, , , 	) are the vector of parameters to be estimated and (εit, 
it) is a
sequence of serially independent stochastic error terms with a well-defined
joint distribution.
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Table 12.6 Dividend yields and shares of foreign investors: Regression (2)
Dynamic Model
Variable 1995–2004 1995–1998 1999–2004
FS(t – 1) –0.0246*** –0.0141 –0.0381**
(0.0090) (0.0224) (0.0130)
Investment 0.0015 0.0055 –0.0041
(0.0032) (0.0053) (0.0083)
ROA 0.0015 0.0026 0.0025
(0.0014) (0.0071) (0.0019)
Fixed debt 0.0012 –0.0155*** 0.0026
(0.0014) (0.0059) (0.0021)
Cash flow -0.0083 –0.0299 –0.0102
(0.0055) (0.0210) (0.0075)
Size 0.3004* –0.0080 0.2273
(0.1798) (0.4435) (0.3339)
DY(t – 1) 0.1383*** 0.6823*** 0.2706***
(0.0260) (0.2429) (0.0486)
Number of observations 3,699 1,233 1,644
Sargan test 256.76***(44) 9.66**(5) 96.33**(9)
Notes: Dependent variable = dividend yield. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sargan is the
test statistic for overidentifying restrictions and degrees of freedom are in the parentheses.
*Statistically significant at 10%
***Statistically significant at 1%
**Statistically significant at 5%
Following Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), one can transform
equation (3) into a set of two estimating functions without individual fixed
eﬀect:
(4) DYit  α0t  ∑
m1
l1
αltDYitl  ∑
m1
l1
bltFSitl  uit
FSit  c0t  ∑
m1
l1
cltDYitl  ∑
m1
l1
dltFSitl  vit
GMM with the following orthogonality conditions bring us a consistent
estimator:
E [DYisuit ]  E [FSisuit ]  0 for s  (t  1)
E [DYisvit ]  E [FSisvit ]  0 for s  (t  1)
The null hypotheses of the traditional Granger causality test are given as:
(5) H0 : β1t  β2t  . . .  βmt  0 ∀t
H0 : 1t  2t  . . .  mt  0 ∀t
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Table 12.7 Dividend yields and shares of foreign investors: Regression (3)
Basic model: Total listed companies
Variable 1992–2004 1992–1998 1999–2004
FS(t – 1) –0.0015 0.0021 –0.0093
(0.0057) (0.0106) (0.0064)
(p-value 14.5%)
Investment 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0011)
ROA 0.0009 0.0152*** 0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0049) (0.0006)
Fixed debt 0.0018 –0.0012 –0.0028
(0.0236) (0.0321) (0.0417)
Cash flow 0.0035 –0.0183* 0.0001
(0.0043) (0.0107) (0.0040)
Size 0.5141*** -0.2668 0.5382***
(0.1093) (0.2504) (0.1488)
number of observations. 7,873 4,156 3,717
R2 0.0143 0.0037 0.0171
Wald test 173.12***(16) 34.56***(9) 92.5***(10)
Notes: Dependent variable = dividend yield. Standard errors are in parentheses. Wald is the
test statistic for the null hypothesis that all coefficients except for constant term are jointly
zero and degrees of freedom are in the parentheses. The sample includes all firms both listed
and delisted for each period.
*Statistically significant at 10%
**Statistically significant at 5%
***Statistically significant at 1%
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) show that testing equation (5) in
(3) is equivalent to testing the following null hypotheses in (4):
(6) H0 : b1t  b2t  . . .  bmt  b(m1),t  0 ∀t
H0 : c1t  c2t  . . .  cmt  c(m1),t  0 ∀t
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) also suggest a Wald-type test
statistic based on the diﬀerence between the residuals of a restricted and
unrestricted model.
The test statistics are reported in table 12.9. We reject the null hypothe-
sis that share of foreign investors does not Granger-cause dividend yield
for the period from 1994 to 2004. However, we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that dividend yield does not Granger-cause share of foreign in-
vestors for the same period. Second, for the precrisis period, we do not ob-
tain a consistent conclusion on the interaction between share of foreign
investors and dividend yield. Third, for the postcrisis period, share of for-
eign investors help explain dividend yield, but not vice versa.
In sum, Granger causality tests in this section confirm that the eﬀect of
foreign investors on the cost of capital (dividend yield) unfolded its poten-
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Table 12.8 Dividend yields and shares of foreign investors: Regression (4)
Dynamic Model
Variable 1994–2004 1994–1998 1999–2004
FS(t – 1) –0.0044 0.0049 –0.0331***
(0.0083) (0.0135) (0.0105)
Investment –0.0015 –0.0006 –0.0043
(0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0067)
ROA 0.0006 0.0163 0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0058) (0.0011)
Fixed debt 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0013)
Cash flow –0.0117*** –0.0331*** –0.0006
(0.0048) (0.0120) (0.0051)
Size 0.1889 –0.7420** 0.0740
(0.1781) (0.3448) (0.2438)
DY(t – 1) 0.5262*** -0.0081 0.2838***
(0.0130) (0.0323) (0.0410)
Number of observations 6,387 2,832 2,339
Sargan test 4,227.5***(65) 2,467.06***(14) 111.89***(9)
Notes: Dependent variable = dividend yield. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sargan is the
test statistic for overidentifying restrictions and degrees of freedom are in the parentheses.
The sample includes all firms both listed and de-listed for each period.
*Statistically significant at 10%
**Statistically significant at 5%
***Statistically significant at 1%
tial in full scale after 1999, when capital market liberalization was com-
pleted and the foreign participation rate rose.
12.5 Conclusion
We have examined the eﬀect of market opening on the dividend yield
based on the Korean data. We employed firm level panel regression ap-
proaches, focusing on relationships between foreign participation rates
and dividend yields. We found that the larger the foreign participation rate
is, the lower the dividend yield is. But, the relationship is only significant in
the postcrisis period when the Korean stock market was fully opened and
foreign participation rate was relatively higher. The results are diﬀerent
from the existing studies based on cross-country data that find the eﬀect of
market opening realizes in the early stage of opening.
The purpose of this chapter is focused on testing the prediction of a stan-
dard asset-pricing model that market opening allows further risk sharing
and so reduces the cost of capital. Hence, we intentionally interpreted re-
sults of the chapter in view of the risk-sharing story. However, a number of
alternative interpretations are possible. Specifically, the negative relation-
ship between foreign participation rates and dividend yields may be due to
some other factors. Shleifer’s (1986) price pressure is one candidate. For-
eign investors’ trading advantage as argued by Froot, O’Connell, and
Seasholes (2001) is another. In addition, if foreign shareholders can induce
better management of firms by improving corporate governance, the gov-
ernance channel can make a third factor.
Given these alternative interpretations, we have no intention to conclude
that an increase in foreign participation indicates expanded risk-sharing
opportunities. Rather, by showing that the negative relationship between
foreign participation and the cost of capital exists in the postliberalization
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Table 12.9 Granger causality test
FS → DY DY → FS
# of lags 2-statistics d.f. p-value 2-statistics d.f. p-value
1994–2004
1 43.2231 16 0.0003 22.1696 16 0.1378
2 47.3938 21 0.0008 28.5234 21 0.1259
1994–1998
1 8.0402 4 0.0901 15.5057 4 0.0038
2 3.5896 3 0.3093 5.1844 3 0.1578
1999–2004
1 15.3385 6 0.0178 9.6124 6 0.1646
2 20.4021 6 0.0023 10.085 6 0.1211
period, in contrast to the existing works on the eﬀect of market opening on
the cost of capital, this chapter cautions that market opening may not au-
tomatically induce foreign investors to exploit expanded risk-sharing op-
portunities. At the minimum, this chapter suggests we need more work to
understand why market opening leads to revaluation of stocks.
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Comment Yuko Hashimoto
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the impacts of the liberaliza-
tion of the Korea stock market on the cost of capital. The research covers
a decade, from 1994 to 2005, of the liberalization process of the Korean
stock market. The authors estimate the eﬀect of foreign participation rate
on dividend yield and consider causality between the two. There is litera-
ture that focuses on the Korean stock market from the cost of capital point
of view but this research is perhaps the first to expand the sample period to
the post-currency crisis period. By dividing the sample period into two, a
partially regulated period from 1994 to 1997 and a deregulated period from
and after 1998, the authors try to compare the performance of the surviv-
ing firms and all (dead  listed) firms.
The authors find that foreign participation significantly reduced the 
dividend yield for the period 1999–2004, while it significantly increased 
the dividend yield for the period 1995–98, regardless of the estimation
methodology. These results are opposite to the existing literature in that
the eﬀect of deregulation appears at the early stage of liberalization. It is
also found that during the partial deregulation period, the dividend yield
granger-caused foreign participation, while the foreign participation
granger-caused the dividend yield during the deregulated period.
These findings are interpreted as the fact that it takes some time before
the liberalization eﬀect (reduction of cost of capital) emerges in the pro-
cess, and the negative relationship between foreign ownership and the div-
idend yield became significant only recent years.
The chapter is well summarized, the objective is clear, and the findings
are interesting. This is a very good chapter. Still, I would like to make three
comments.
The first comment is about the story. This chapter confirms previous
studies that liberalization does reduce the cost of capital. That is, this 
chapter shows that the liberalization eﬀect appears in the latter stages of
the liberalization process, whereas existing papers say it appears at the
early stage. But it seems that results depend on the choice of variables and
sample period. As the liberalization progresses and market becomes much
more open to the world, the share of foreign participation rises as well. As
is clear from figure 12.3, there is a big jump in the change in the share of
foreign participation (slope of the participation) from 1992–1993, when
the liberalization started, and 1999–2001, the final stages of the process.
The results perhaps only reflect this fact, the endogeneity between the lib-
eralization and the share of foreign participation. As for the sample-period
problem, the latter subsample period in the estimation exactly overlaps the
post-Asian currency crisis. The reduction of cost of capital is partly due to
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a strong stock price recovery after 1997. It would be favorable to separate
the Asian crisis factors from the dividend yield.
The second comment relates to the interpretation of the results. The
chapter tries to study “the cost of capital after a stock market opening”
based on the assumption that “the cost of capital ( dividend yield) de-
creases in response to market opening because . . . foreigners become mar-
ginal investors.” Another interpretation is applicable to this research. For-
eign participants are also attracted to a firm with good balance sheets,
ROA, cash flow, and high dividends. In this line, a positive relationship be-
tween dividend yield and foreign participation is possible. The authors
should also take into account the potential investment opportunity, that is,
a firm facing good investment opportunities will invest its earnings rather
than pay dividends. Include Tobin’s q or sales growth rate as control vari-
ables for potential investment opportunity and see whether the results are
robust.
The third comment relates to the deregulation in December of 1997.
There were twice relaxations in the foreign investment ceilings in the Ko-
rean stock market that month, on December 11 and 30. Foreign invest-
ment ceilings for ordinary companies were raised from 26 percent to 50
percent on December 11, and the limit on foreign individual ownership
was raised from 7 percent to 50 percent on the same day (and then both
ceilings were raised up to 55 percent on December 30). Obviously, this was
when the Korean currency crisis was erupting. I am just curious why the
ceiling was raised twice at that time. Is it something to do with IMF condi-
tionality, or did the Korean authority intend to invite money from abroad
in order to create appreciation pressure on the Korean Won? In any case,
the authors should try to devote one or two pages for the background of
the Korean stock market at this time, which would improve the contribu-
tion of this chapter more and help readers to understand the deregulation
process in Korea. The regime change in the foreign exchange rate system
must have aﬀected the behavior of foreign investors to some extent, and the
cost of capital as well. Therefore, exchange rate regime switch should be
controlled for in the estimation. The easiest way is to use a dummy.
Comment Chulsoo Kim
In a standard international asset pricing model, stock market opening re-
duces an opening economy’s cost of capital by allowing for risk sharing be-
tween domestic and foreign agents. Using cross-country data, current lit-
erature, Bekaert-Harvey (2000), Henry (2000), and Kim-Singal (2000),
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confirms this implication. This chapter examines the cost of capital after
the stock market opening in Korea with two distinctive approaches. First,
the chapter uses a longer time horizon (fifteen years). Stock market open-
ing is a gradual process, taking several years to be completed. Yet, the lit-
erature examines two or three years around the initial opening. It is inter-
esting to see the eﬀects on the cost of capital around and after the initial
opening. Second, the chapter uses a firm-level data set. This chapter ex-
amines if firms with higher foreign ownership will see more reduction in the
cost of capital.
This chapter finds that the higher the degree of foreign ownership in a
firm, the lower the dividend yield is. It has been significant, however, only
during the recent years when the Korea stock market has been fully
opened, which is a contrast to the literature that finds the eﬀects around the
initial liberalization dates.
This chapter makes an important contribution to the literature by ex-
amining the eﬀects of a stock market opening on individual stocks instead
of aggregate cross-country data. The individual-firm data set contains rich
information that we cannot get in the aggregate cross-country data set.
Therefore, this chapter can shed new light on the eﬀects of a stock market
opening. I have several comments that may help to strengthen this chap-
ter’s claim.
First, in this chapter, the cost of capital is equal to dividend yield. Yet,
we are ultimately interested in how the stock market opening may benefit
or hurt a country. When the volatility increases, however, a country may
not be better oﬀ even if the cost of capital decreases. For example, short-
term capital inflow may lead to a sudden withdrawal from the country,
which may in turn cause an economic crisis as in Asia in 1997. Hence, the
cost of capital would be better examined in terms of volatility as well as div-
idend yield.
Second, the chapter needs to examine if the foreign participation rate is
a good proxy for the stock market opening. The identification assumption
of this chapter is that if market opening decreases the cost of capital with
more foreign investors, the impact of the market opening would be more
visible in firms with higher foreign participation rates. Yet, the foreign par-
ticipation rate can increase due to several reasons.
The increase in the foreign participation rate could be due to the stock
market opening as the chapter claims. This explanation may be important
in the initial opening of 1992, but less important after that. Mean and me-
dian foreign participation rates have been under a ceiling constraint. For
most firms, the ceiling constraint did not bind. Many foreign investors
bought less than they were allowed except for a small number of popular
stocks. If the stock market opening is the main driving force behind the in-
crease in the foreign participation rate, the foreign investors should be in-
diﬀerent among stocks and the participation rate should increase for all
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stocks. There are, however, some stocks that foreign investors like to buy
and other stocks foreign investors do not like to buy, which suggests that
the foreign participation rate depends on more than the market opening.
Specifically, the foreign participation rate may increase when the foreign
investors expect better prospects in the Korean economy or in a particular
stock. Hence, foreign participation rate alone may not be a good measure
of market opening. This chapter needs a structural model of the foreign
participation rate and needs to sort out the market opening eﬀect. Al-
though this paper conducts Granger causality tests between dividend
yields and the share of foreign investors, foreign investors may use more in-
formation than dividend yields in picking stocks, and hence the foreign
participation rate should be explicitly modeled.
Third, this chapter needs to distinguish between the Asian crisis of 1997
and the stock market opening in 1998. Economic reforms after the crisis
may have caused higher foreign participation rates. Although economic re-
forms are controlled by a time-dummy variable in this chapter, some re-
forms aﬀect individual firms diﬀerently. For example, after the fall of Dae-
woo, the “too big to fail” policy is no longer expected. Foreign banks
started to monitor loans more carefully. Some grassroots groups de-
manded more shareholder rights from certain firms. These changes led to
more transparency in certain firms, but the eﬀects were not uniformly dis-
tributed across firms. Therefore, a time-dummy would not be able to cap-
ture all these eﬀects, and the chapter needs to control for economic reforms
after the Asian crisis.
Fourth, do lower dividend yields with higher foreign participations con-
firm the benefit of the market opening? Maybe, but there exists another
possibility. Korean investors often imitate foreign investors, possibly be-
cause Koreans may think that foreigners have better skills in picking win-
ning stocks. In this case, Koreans shift their portfolio from the stocks that
foreigners do not prefer to the stocks they do. This would lead to lower div-
idend yields for the stocks that foreigners prefer and higher dividend yields
for the stocks which they do not. This can be tested since the chapter has
all the individual data. When the foreign participation rates increase, it
could be due to the market opening or the higher demand for the stock.
When the foreign participation rates decrease, however, it could not be due
to the market opening and it must be due to the lower demand for the
stock. In other words, when the foreign participation rate decreases, the
negative change has nothing to do with the market opening. Therefore, if
dividend yields increase when the foreign participation rate has decreased,
the dividend yield change is caused by the lower demand for the stock, in-
stead of the market opening.
Fifth, this chapter can try a counterfactual study. Assuming there was no
stock market opening in 1992 or 1998, this chapter can examine the divi-
dend yield. Then, the chapter can examine interesting implications, such as
412 Inseok Shin and Chang-Gyun Park
how many firms have benefited or lost from the market opening, how much
the cost of capital has decreased, and how many changes in volatilities
there have been.
Sixth, this chapter discusses why dividend yields have increased after the
economic crisis of 1997, when the Korean stock market was fully opened
and foreign participation in the market were increasing. This chapter then
provides four possible explanations. The first explanation is that the de-
creasing eﬀect of the market opening was realized around the initial period
of market opening. Other changes, such as the lowered growth prospect of
the Korean economy after the Asian crisis of 1997, may be responsible. The
second explanation is that the decrease in the dividend yield during the pre-
crisis period is an eﬀect of other factors instead of the initial market open-
ing measures. The third explanation is that other factors that aﬀect divi-
dend flows are responsible. The fourth explanation is the rejection of the
prediction that the market opening should lower the cost of capital. For-
eign investors may be myopic and seek to maximize short-term returns.
Yet, these four explanations seem to contradict the findings in the chapter.
Therefore, this chapter should attempt to reconcile the increase in dividend
yields after 1997 with the results from this chapter.
Seventh, Korea started to open a stock market in 1992 and completed
the opening in 1998. Even if the stock market was partially opened in 1992,
most of the eﬀect of the opening should have taken place around 1992,
since market participants rationally expect the full opening later and in-
corporate that information in 1992. The expected future increase of the
foreign participation rate would be reflected in 1992, while the unexpected
increase would be reflected in 1998. This chapter hence needs to discuss
when the government announced the market opening, and if the govern-
ment exactly followed the initial plan for the opening, so that the chapter
can test the expected and unexpected eﬀects of the event.
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